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Abstract 
Health promotion interventions in low and mid-income countries (LMIC) are 
increasingly integrating strategies to change local social norms that sustain harmful practices. 
However, the literature on social norms and health in LMIC is still scarce. A well-known 
application of social norm theory in LMIC involves abandonment of female genital cutting 
(FGC) in West Africa. We argue that FGC is a special case because of its unique relationship 
between the norm and the practice; health promotion interventions would benefit from a wider 
understanding of how social norms can influence different types of health-related behaviors. We 
hypothesize that four factors shape the strength of a norm over a practice: 1) whether the practice 
is dependent or interdependent; 2) whether it is more or less detectable; 3) whether it is under the 
influence of distal or proximal norms; and 4) whether non-compliance is likely to result in 
sanctions. We look at each of these four factors in detail, and suggest that different relations 
between norms and a practice might require different programmatic solutions. Future findings 
that will confirm or contradict our hypothesis will be critical for effective health promotion 
interventions that aim to change harmful social norms in LMIC. 
Keywords: Social Norms; Social Influence; Behavioral Change; Implementation; Health 
Promotion; Low and mid-income countries; IPV; FGC; Harmful Practices.  
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Four avenues of normative influence: a research agenda for health 
promotion in low and mid-income countries 
 
In the last decade, individuals working to promote health and eliminate harmful practices 
in low and mid-income countries (LMIC) have expressed growing interest in new applications of 
social norms theory.  Following the discovery that changing social norms could help people in 
West and Central Africa abandon female genital cutting (FGC), many development scholars, 
donors, and practitioners have invested time and resources to understand if and how changing 
norms through community dialogues can lead to improvements in a wider range of health 
outcomes. To maximize impact, however, we need to enhance understanding of the different 
ways in which social norms exert influence on people’s action.  The norms approach, which was 
successfully deployed to reduce FGC, may not be equally applicable to other behaviors and 
practices. Moreover, evidence suggests that failed attempts at norm change might strengthen a 
norm further. This happens when a few non-compliers try to publicly resist the norm but are 
sanctioned by those invested in their compliance. Their public failure can diminish chances that 
people will try to destabilize the norm in the future, afraid of failing and facing similar sanctions 
(Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985).  
Norms are of course but one factor contributing to a given behavior; successful 
interventions need to address all those factors, a point that we have addressed elsewhere 
(reference anonymized). In this paper, we look specifically at social norms, offering critical 
reflections on the different ways in which social norms can influence people’s actions. In the first 
section, we review various norm-related theories and their application to health promotion in 
LMIC.  In the second section, we argue that an “all or nothing” view of normative influence— 
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that they either drive behavior or have negligible influence—is not helpful to practitioners. 
Instead we suggest that norms likely have different levels of influence, based on key 
characteristics of the behavior under study. In the concluding section, we propose a research 
agenda to test empirically whether the characteristics we hypothesize as relevant do indeed affect 
the relationship between norms and health-related behaviors.  
Background: Social norms and health promotion in low and mid-income countries  
Social norms–the unwritten rules governing acceptable behavior in a society or a group–
have been the object of much research and practice in the last two decades (Mackie, Moneti, 
Shakya, & Denny, 2015; Mollen, Rimal, & Lapinski, 2010). Although their general influence on 
people’s actions has long been known (Durkheim, 1951; Gibbs, 1965; Hume, [1739] 1978; 
Schwartz, 1977; Sumner, 1907), only recently has there been rapid growth in both the scientific 
literature on health norms (Mollen et al., 2010) and in the number of health-related issues 
addressed by interventions using social norms approaches (Chung & Rimal, 2016; Miller & 
Prentice, 2016; Tankard & Paluck, 2016).  Research has linked social norms to many health-
related behaviors, including: food intake (Vartanian, Spanos, Herman, & Polivy, 2015), alcohol 
consumption (Prentice & Miller, 1993; Prestwich et al., 2016), smoking (Eisenberg & Forster, 
2003), use of recreational drugs (Jiloha, 2009; Perkins, 2003), condom use (Hu et al., 2014), 
physical activity (Ball, Jeffery, Abbott, McNaughton, & Crawford, 2010), corporal punishment 
of children (Taylor et al., 2016), intimate partner violence (Linos, Slopen, Subramanian, 
Berkman, & Kawachi, 2013), water purification (Mausezahl et al., 2009), and hand washing 
(Curtis, Danquah, & Aunger, 2009), to cite just a few examples.  
Although there is general agreement that norms influence behavior, there are several 
different theories on exactly when and how they do so. For instance, in one of the few existing 
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reviews of the social norms literature, Bell and Cox (2015) identified four main pathways that 
help explain people’s compliance with social norms: 1) Uncertainty (e.g. I don’t know how to 
behave so I look at what others do and do the same); 2) Identity (e.g. I comply with the norm to 
express my membership in a group); 3) Reward (e.g. I behave expecting positive sanctions for 
compliance); and 4) Enforcement (e.g. I am coerced into compliance) (for more reviews see:  
Brennan, Eriksson, Goodin, & Southwood, 2013; Chung & Rimal, 2016; Elsenbroich & Gilbert, 
2014; Lapinski & Rimal, 2005; Mackie et al., 2015; Morris, Hong, Chiu, & Liu, 2015; Young, 
2015). These theoretical streams further divide into multiple sub-theories, each holding potential 
value for guiding interventions. In this paper, we use the definition put forward by recent work in 
social psychology, namely that norms are: 1) beliefs about what others in a given group do (that 
is, what is typical in the group); and 2) beliefs about what others in a given group approve and 
disapprove of (that is, what is appropriate in the group) (e.g. Bicchieri, 2006; Cialdini, Kallgren, 
& Reno, 1991; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010; Gibbs, 1965; Lapinski & Rimal, 
2005; Lewis, 2002; Mackie et al., 2015).  While naming conventions for those two types of 
beliefs differ, most of the contemporary literature follows Cialdini (Cialdini et al., 1991; Cialdini 
& Trost, 1998) in referring to the first type as descriptive norms and to the second type as 
injunctive norms.  
Norms exert influence over people’s actions in many ways and through many 
mechanisms, the full review of which goes beyond the scope of this paper (but see: Chung & 
Rimal, 2016; C. Horne, 2007; Young, 2015). One of the most commonly cited mechanisms of 
normative power (and probably one of the strongest) is social influence: compliers are positively 
sanctioned (praised, accepted in the group, for instance), while non-compliers are negatively 
sanctioned (gossiped about, isolated, or threatened, for example). People naturally seek rewards 
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and avoid punishments.  In the case of norms, even the anticipation of potential sanctions is 
sufficient to keep a social norm locked in place (Bicchieri, 2006; Elster, 2007; Xenitidou & 
Edmonds, 2014).  For the purpose of the present paper, then, we define social norms as people’s 
beliefs about what others do (descriptive norms) and/or approve of (injunctive norms), held in 
place, at least in part, by anticipation of positive and negative sanctions.   
Cialdini’s theory described above was derived from empirical experiments conducted on 
a wide range of issues in high-income countries, including norms around littering (Cialdini et al., 
1991; Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg, 2008),  towel usage in hotels (Goldstein, Cialdini, & 
Griskevicius, 2008), removal of stones from natural parks (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, 
& Griskevicius, 2007), and college drinking (Prentice & Miller, 1993). Even though these 
studies offered ground-breaking contributions to social norm theory, their relevance for the 
promotion of positive health outcomes in LMIC is still untested.  
One practice that has yielded important insights for health promotion in LMIC, is the 
case of female genital cutting (FGC) in West Africa.  Here another theoretical stream of social 
norms theory, based on game theory, has been used extensively to understand the persistence of 
FGC, a non-medically justified modification of women’s genitalia that poses a global health 
threat to 140 million women and girls globally (Wagner, 2015).  This variant of norms theory is 
specifically useful when considering interdependent behaviors—those where individuals cannot 
achieve their objective without coordinating their behaviors with others (Mackie & LeJeune, 
2009; Shell-Duncan, Wander, Hernlund, & Moreau, 2011). In places where uncircumcised girls 
are not marriageable (as in Senegal), FGC is a highly interdependent practice. In a seminal 
article on FGC in West Africa, for instance, Mackie (1996) suggested that since only cut girls are 
considered pure and marriageable, parents have little choice but to subject their daughters to the 
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practice. Even though collective departure from the cutting norm would result in greater health 
for all, no single individual or family could depart from the norm without suffering severe 
consequences (in the case of FGC in Senegal, their daughter not being married).   
The norms theory developed by Mackie to explain the persistence of FGC allows for 
contextual differences: in The Gambia, for instance, Shell-Duncan and colleagues (2011) found 
stronger normative associations between FGC and social prestige among peers, than FGC and 
marriageability.  While their work confirmed Mackie’s theory that FGC can be held in place by a 
system of norms, it uncovered a different set of social sanctions shared across the group. Mackie 
found that cutting populations in rural Senegal anticipated marriageability as a positive reward 
for the cutting; Shell-Duncan and colleagues found that women in Gambia went through the 
cutting anticipating increased prestige among peers.   
The Case of Tostan in West Africa 
Without pre-existing knowledge of social norms theory, but following the insights of 
local Imam Demba Diawara, the Senegalese NGO Tostan has been able to exploit the 
interdependent nature of FGC to facilitate its abandonment in rural Senegal. In addition to 
catalyzing critical reflection through a three-year long educational curriculum, Tostan helps 
parents (who have learned and discussed the harmful consequences of FGC and are committed to 
ending the practice) to motivate others in their and the surrounding communities to abandon the 
practice, making collective, public pledges to leave their daughters intact and to no longer 
demand circumcision for marriage.  Through this means, Tostan is able to reduce FGC by 
releasing communities from the powerful, interdependent norm that kept the practice in place. 
Two rigorous evaluations confirmed a reduction in FGC among communities that participated in 
the Tostan programme (Mackie & LeJeune, 2009; Young, 2015).  
FOUR AVENUES OF NORMATIVE INFLUENCE  8 
The success of Tostan in reducing FGC has made its approach to norm change popular in 
the development sector, where various actors are now applying this model (among others) to 
problematic norms that sustain harmful gender-related practices (Bajaj, Cislaghi, & Mackie, 
2016; Cislaghi, forthcoming; Cislaghi, Gillespie, & Mackie, 2016; Jewkes, Flood, & Lang, 2015; 
Marcus & Page, 2014; Powell, 2017; Temmerman, 2015). Tostan’s approach is certainly 
promising: their work has affected a variety of behaviors beyond FGC, including normative 
change around child marriage. However, one should be careful in translating approaches to norm 
change based on one practice, to other health-related outcomes. FGC in Senegal presents an 
almost unique case where the behavior itself is both highly normative and interdependent.  Not 
all health-related related behaviors fulfil these criteria. Exactly how norms influence a health-
related practice depends in part on the nature of the practice itself, and how norms relate to that 
practice. Understanding normative influence is thus extremely important for designing effective 
interventions. 
Widening the spectrum of normative influence 
Norms are among the many social processes that influence people’s actions, and are very 
rarely (if ever) the only factor sustaining a practice (e.g. Darnton, 2008; Rimal & Real, 2003). 
The strength of their influence can be affected by many factors such as the place and moment 
that the action is carried out, the nature of the behavior, as well as people’s other social and non-
social (factual) beliefs. There are many different models of how norms can affect attitudes and 
behaviors (Davis, Campbell, Hildon, Hobbs, & Michie, 2015). Among the most commonly cited 
are: the Theory of Planned Behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010); Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 2004); the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct (Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000); and 
the Theory of Normative Social Behavior (Chung & Rimal, 2016). Even though they have 
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advanced the field considerably, none of these theories offers a device to differentiate among 
levels of normative strength to inform health promotion interventions.  
We propose here a working hypothesis of how normative influence might vary across 
different health-related practices and contexts. Our hypothesis is informed by the literature and 
our own personal observations. We are particularly interested in and familiar with the literature 
on gender-based violence. Comparing FGC with other gender-related harmful practice, we note 
that four salient characteristics of FGC seem to strengthen the influence of the norm over the 
practice. Future empirical research will allow us to test whether our theory is relevant only for 
gender-related practices, other health-related behavior, or neither. The four factors that we 
hypothesize play a key role in influencing normative strength are: 1) whether the practice is 
independent or interdependent; 2) whether the practice is detectable or not; 3) whether 
compliance is subject to weak or strong sanctions and how likely they are; and 4) whether the 
practice is influenced by distal or proximal norms. We explore each of these factors below. 
Independent vs Interdependent  
Researchers have long possessed evidence that people’s action are influenced by 
interaction with others (Lewin, 1948). Investigating how and why people carry out certain social 
actions—particularly those allowing them to achieve common or collective goals—led Thibaut 
and Kelley (1959) to expand upon Lewin’s observations in their “interdependence theory”. 
Interdependence theory is complex, and includes up to 21 different behavioral patterns (Kelley, 
2003). Here, we offer a simplified summary of three main conceptual categories (independent, 
dependent, and interdependent) for the purposes of our investigation.  
Human action varies from highly independent, to dependent, to highly interdependent 
(Mackie et al., 2015; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Van Lange & Balliet, 2015). In carrying out an 
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independent action, the actor doesn’t need to know what others are doing to achieve a desired 
outcome and, similarly, others don’t care about what she is doing. Each can follow their 
individual preference; a woman living alone, for instance, doesn’t need to coordinate with her 
neighbors to decide whether to brush her teeth before going to bed. One might be tempted to 
conclude that independent actions are outside of the normative sphere. Instead, we think that 
norms can still influence independent behaviors, albeit not as strongly as for other types of 
actions. A fairly independent behavior, blood donation, for instance, has been found to be more 
strongly influenced by the donators’ personal attitude toward donation than descriptive social 
norms; descriptive norms did have a mild influence, but much less so than the person’s 
individual judgement about the importance of donating blood (Piliavin & Libby, 1986). 
In carrying out a dependent action, one needs to know what others are doing to achieve a 
given outcome, but others don’t care whether or how one might succeed in doing so. 
Dependence can take many forms (Kelley, 2003). One relevant example is an action carried out 
to be accepted in a group, so that one conforms with others’ actions to obtain their approval. 
Think of an adolescent boy who recently joined a school and smokes hashish to be accepted by a 
group of older, popular boys. He needs to mimic what they do, to gain social status, but his 
decision to comply (or not) might not affect the boys he is trying to impress. Both descriptive 
and injunctive norms are important in the case of dependent actions: the boy needs to know what 
the cool boys do (smoking), and what they approve of (him smoking) to be accepted in the group 
(positive sanction). Much research has been done on the role that norms play in influencing 
students’ smoking and substance use choices. Recent reviews indicate that evidence of normative 
influence over those behaviors is mixed (Halim, Hasking, & Allen, 2012; Jiloha, 2009; 
McAlaney & Jenkins, 2015; Prestwich et al., 2016). This suggests that dependent actions may 
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cover a large part of the normative spectrum, from weaker to stronger influence, and may vary in 
strength based on context.   
Finally, in interdependent actions, a few non-cooperators can compromise the group’s 
goals so that everyone is invested in everyone else’s compliance. A classic example of an 
interdependent action is resource management. Fishermen, for example, need to find cooperative 
ways to ensure the sustainability of their fishing practices (so that each of them must avoid 
overfishing) and do so based on reciprocal beliefs that others will respect the norm (Cronk & 
Leech, 2013; De, Nau, & Gelfand, 2016; Mackie et al., 2015; Ostrom, 2014; Young, 2015). 
When they regulate interdependent practices, people might protect and enforce norms as these 
norms help them deal with important social problems or dilemmas. In other words, in the case of 
interdependent practices, the group will actively ensure compliance of a non-complying member, 
as they are invested in achieving the given outcome (preserving fish stocks, for example) to 
which the norm contributes and for which group compliance is required. 
Sometimes however, interdependent behaviors can be counterproductive to health, as in 
the case of FGC. When families coordinate to solve the social dilemma of finding an appropriate 
spouse for their children, they reinforce the harmful norm of genital cutting. Not only do girls’ 
parents have an interest in cutting, but boys’ parents do too, because only circumcised girls are 
considered suitable brides. Compliance with the norm of FGC allows both sets of parents to 
ensure marriage of their children. People are unlikely to defect from the norm unless they can be 
assured that their own daughters will not suffer.  The only way to break the norm is for everyone 
to change at once (coordinate), so that a generation of girls remain uncut and will enter the 
marriage market along with other intact young women (Mackie & LeJeune, 2009). 
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More detectable vs less detectable 
Human beings are highly sensitive to scrutiny. We have an innate tendency to enact 
prosocial behavior when we believe others are watching. This tendency is so strong that people 
modify their behavior even when exposed to pictures of eyes on a poster (Bateson, Callow, 
Holmes, Redmond Roche, & Nettle, 2013; Nettle et al., 2013), non-human eyes (Haley & 
Fessler, 2005), or the abstract representation of a face (Rigdon, Ishii, Watabe, & Kitayama, 
2009). Laboratory experiments suggest that eye gaze influences behavior because it activates 
one’s concerns for his or her reputation (Manesi, Van Lange, & Pollet, 2016).  
The simple reminder that others might know what we are doing may thus act as a 
deterrent to norm violation.  We hypothesize that more detectable practices are likely under 
stronger normative influence because people anticipate that their compliance or non-compliance 
will be known by others–either through direct witnessing or indirect testimony (Albarracin et al., 
2005; Leung & Morris, 2014). In an empirical experiment conducted in a public toilet in New 
York, the simple presence of an observer doubled the percentage of people who washed their 
hands after having used the toilet (Munger & Harris, 1989).  And ethnographic observations of 
lobster fishermen in Maine found that, to ensure everyone’s compliance with fishing norms, they 
evolved a system to let non-compliers know that their violation of fishing norms has been 
detected. They tie a visible piece of cloth to their fishing pots (the first time they transgress) as to 
say, “I have detected that you are fishing in a place where you are not supposed to, next time you 
do it we’ll kick you out of the group” (Janssen & Ostrom, 2014).  
Compliance with non-detectable practices is less likely to be known by others and is 
usually under weaker normative influence. Injunctive norms against peeing in the swimming 
pools exist, but their strength is weakened by the fact that swimmers know that non-compliance 
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will go undetected (Brennan et al., 2013; Water Quality and Health Council, 2012). And in a 
seminal study in 1932, Schanck reported that while residents of Elm Hollow unanimously stated 
their public support for the Methodist church’s prohibition against card playing, smoking, and 
drinking alcohol, they would do all those things in the privacy of their homes, where others 
couldn’t see them (Schanck, 1932). More recently, a food-behavior experiment at Stanford 
University revealed that while participating students publicly stated they had changed their food 
preferences to match those of their peers (from unhealthy to healthful), they still ate as much 
candy when they thought nobody was watching them (Templeton, Stanton, & Zaki, 2016).  
Some commentators argue that sometimes norms can be internalized, that is, they can 
influence a person’s behavior even when there is no audience to witness it (Andrighetto, Grieco, 
& Tummolini, 2015; Elsenbroich & Gilbert, 2014; Reynolds, Subašić, & Tindall, 2014; 
Xenitidou & Edmonds, 2014). That is possible, especially when norms-complying actions 
contribute to one’s sense of identity (Albarracin et al., 2005; Anderson, 2000; Bardi & Goodwin, 
2011), or when the norm is salient at the time of the action (Cialdini et al., 2006; Keizer et al., 
2008). But the opposite can also be true: people might in private consciously behave against the 
norm, even when they are aware of it, because they hold contrasting values, preferences, or 
beliefs (Leung & Morris, 2014). In a seminal study by Deutsch and Gerard (Deutsch & Gerard, 
1955), the researchers found that participants were influenced by norms both in private and 
public spaces, but that their conformity was higher when their  behavior was visible to others. 
Aware of similar findings, we are not suggesting that norms never exert influence over 
undetectable practices (if anything we are arguing the opposite); but on a spectrum of normative 
strength, non-detectable actions might fall closer to the weak-influence end of the spectrum. 
FGC might fall on the stronger end, as it is often (though not always) celebrated in a public 
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ceremony marking girls’ passage to womanhood. Halder and colleagues (2015), for instance, 
reported that the Pokot of Northwest Kenya describe the cutting ceremony as a very attractive 
and popular event that gathers a crowd of people from neighboring villages. There, the practice 
is witnessed by many: parents know that their daughter’s potential future husbands and his 
parents will know (or will know someone who knows) if their daughter has been cut or not.  
Weak or unlikely vs strong or likely sanctions 
The likelihood of sanctions also varies. Detectability of the norm makes sanctioning 
possible (others can sanction only if they know of one’s non-compliance), but other factors shape 
how probable it is that people will sanction a behavior. Appropriate sanctioning can be costly, 
effortful or risky, and people might not be willing to engage in it. One might also refrain from 
sanctioning because he or she doesn’t know other group members well enough to anticipate their 
reactions. There are also opposite forces pushing for sanctioning: the belief that norms are a 
common good to be protected; the impulse to protect a group member hurt by the non-complier;  
the need to demonstrate group identity to others or self; or a spontaneous tendency to gossip and 
ridicule those who are different from us, for instance (Brennan et al., 2013; Guala, 2012; 
Christine Horne, 2014).  
In addition to being likely or unlikely, sanctions can also be weak or strong; that is, they 
can result in greater or smaller gains or losses for the person (in the ways they affect economic 
assets, reputation, emotional wellbeing, or physical health, for instance) (Anderson, 2000). 
Anticipation of strong sanctions (for instance, losing group membership) will encourage 
compliance more than anticipation of weak or no sanctions (Mackie et al., 2015; Rimal & Real, 
2003).  
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We are not arguing that weak sanctions strip the norm of any influence over behavior.  
There are many other reasons why people comply with norms: emotional commitment to the 
group (Tsai & Bagozzi, 2014); desire to associate with a group identity (Hogg & Reid, 2006); or 
simply to know what to do in an ambiguous situation (Rimal & Real, 2003).  But minor 
improbable sanctions are likely to weaken the overall influence of a norm as compared to strong 
predictable sanctions.  
In the case of FGC, sanctions (e.g. not being able to marry off the uncut girl) are often 
both strong and likely. They are strong, for instance, in places where girls are considered 
economically unproductive and marriage becomes a means to transfer an economic burden. They 
are likely when enforcing them is relatively easy and effortless: often, other parents can simply 
marry their sons to one of the many circumcised girls of the village (Mackie, 1996, 2015; Shell-
Duncan et al., 2011). 
Proximal vs distal normative influence  
Not much theoretical work has been done on the distinction between what we propose to 
call proximal and distal norms, especially in the field of health promotion.  Proximal norms are 
those directly related to the behavior in question whereas distal norms are those indirectly related 
to the practice. Empirical research suggests that salience (the quality of being noticeable) is a 
central driver of normative compliance (Cialdini et al., 2006; Cislaghi et al., 2016; Keizer, 
Lindenberg, & Steg, 2013). Proximal influence is stronger than distal influence, since the 
proximal norm is salient to those engaging in the practice as they do so. Distal norms, on the 
other hand, might not be salient at the time of the practice, and might compete with many other 
indirect social factors and moderators. When they tested the influence of proximal vs distal 
norms on littering practices, Cialdini and colleagues (1991) found that the proximal norm (you 
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shouldn’t litter) had the strongest effect on people’s actions (not littering); the influence of other 
distal norms (you should recycle; you should save energy; you should vote) diminished as the 
distance of these norms from the practice increased. We therefore hypothesize that proximal 
norms have greater influence on behavior, although more distal norms can still make a 
difference.   
There are two ways, that we identified, in which a norm may relate indirectly to a 
behavior: either it is more conceptually distant than a norm that directly addresses the behavior 
in question (as in Cialdini’s experiment above); or it is part of a indirect web of norms that do 
not address the behavior directly, but nonetheless can keep a behavior entrenched. For example, 
the norm “you should cut your daughter” is proximal to the behavior “cutting your daughter,” 
with the former exerting direct influence over the latter. On the other hand, the norm “a neighbor 
shouldn’t interfere in another family’s business” is distal to the behavior “domestic violence,” 
and yet the former might contribute to sustaining the latter, by keeping neighbors from 
communicating disapproval or intervening to interrupt a violent episode. Norms with no direct 
relationship to a practice, can nonetheless help sustain it through a different type of distal 
influence.  Norms around maintaining family privacy—as suggested above—might act to 
perpetuate domestic violence even if there is no norm directly promoting partner violence. 
People might choose not to intervene when they overhear violence, because they don’t think it’s 
acceptable to violate the privacy of the couple. Findings from social norms research on FGC 
suggest that often the practice is under direct normative influence, since parents cutting their 
daughters do so because they think others cut and others expect them to cut as well (Mackie, 
1996, 2015; Shell-Duncan et al., 2011). Whereas norms sustaining wife beating are subtler, and 
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affect the likelihood of surrounding actions: disclosure of violence, seeking help, and others 
intervening. 
A spectrum of normative influence 
We have presented above our hypothesis of four factors that may be critical in 
influencing the strength of a norm over a practice. These are summarized below in Table 1. We 
put forward this list to propose a simplified model of how different factors affect a norm’s social 
influence on different health-related practices.  More elaborate models of how attributes of 
norms influence behavior, have been offered elsewhere (Chung & Rimal, 2016; Jasso & Opp, 
1997; Lascu & Zinkhan, 1999). 
[Table 1 here] 
FGC, as described earlier, scores high on this spectrum: it is interdependent, highly 
detectable, likely to result in strong positive or negative sanctions, and directly under the 
influence of a norm. Practices and behaviors with these characteristics are likely under strong 
influence from both descriptive and injunctive norms. The influence of descriptive norms is 
strengthened by the interdependence of the practice: people need to coordinate or cooperate with 
others to achieve an outcome, so they plan their actions based on what they believe others do. 
The influence of injunctive norms is instead strengthened by the detectability of the practice and 
the likelihood of strong sanctions. People try to avoid strong punishments and seek high rewards 
(the anticipation of which is based on people’s beliefs of what others approve and disapprove 
of); the detectability of the practice would increase the possibility of incurring in those 
punishments or rewards. Finally, proximal distance, we hypothesize, exerts strong influence by 
making both descriptive and injunctive norms more salient; that is, as people perform a given 
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action, they are more easily aware of and sensitive to proximal rather than distal norms (see 
Table 2).   
[Table 2 here] 
To test the validity of this framework, we need a hypothesis on how descriptive and 
injunctive norms influence health-related behaviors located at different points on the spectrum. 
To begin this exploration, we advance here a possible explanation of how descriptive and 
injunctive norms would influence behaviors at the two (weaker and stronger) ends of the 
spectrum (summarized in Table 3).  
Stronger relation. At the stronger end of the scale, interdependence, detectability, 
enforcement and normative distance of the practice strengthen the influence of both descriptive 
and injunctive norms. Carrying out interdependent actions demands compliance with descriptive 
norms (to coordinate and cooperate I need to know what others are doing). Highly detectable 
practices incurring heavy sanctions are under stronger influence of injunctive norms (to avoid 
punishment and obtain rewards I need to know what others approve and disapprove of). Both 
descriptive and injunctive norms that are proximal will exercise stronger influence than distal 
norms.  Behaviors such as FGC would fall on the right-hand side of the spectrum. Other 
behaviors such as teen smoking, may meet most but not all of the criteria, landing them 
nonetheless on a relatively strong end of the spectrum (McAlaney & Jenkins, 2015). One can 
imagine, for example, a context where peer pressure to smoke among teens is strong. In this case, 
the behavior is dependent (an adolescent may need to conform to “belong,” but there is not a 
classic coordination dilemma). The behavior, however, is detectable, subject to sanction (teens 
who refuse may be ridiculed), and proximal (the perceived norm directly relates to the behavior 
in question).  
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Weaker relation. At this end of the scale, the four factors mention above do not possess 
enough strength to exercise heavy normative influence. Independent actions can be carried out 
without considering other people’s behavior; compliance with descriptive norms is not necessary 
to achieve the desired outcome. In the case of undetectable practices incurring light sanctions (if 
any), injunctive norms are also exerting a weaker influence. Finally, the influence of distal norms 
might be weakened both by other competing distal factors and by not being salient at the time of 
the action.  Health-related behaviors tending to fall on the weaker end of the spectrum might 
include: blood donation (Piliavin & Libby, 1986) and domestic violence (Linos et al., 2013). 
These practices are mostly independent, only slightly (if at all) detectable, with small (or no) 
sanctions for non-compliance, and under the influence of bundles of distal norms.  
 
Four avenues of normative influence 
We are not suggesting that weaker normative influence is negligible. There is little doubt 
that beliefs on what others do and approve of still play a role in people’s decision to engage in 
practices such as donating blood or engaging in domestic violence. Rather, we are arguing that 
behaviors under stronger normative influence, such as FGC, are carried out primarily to achieve 
coordination and/or to meet other people’s expectations; behavior at the other end of the 
spectrum is carried out for varied reasons, that may include norms, albeit in a less prominent 
role.  
Differences along this spectrum translate into four types of normative influence (see 
Table 3). At their strongest, norms prescribe or proscribe obligatory behavior. Actors don’t have 
a choice but to conform, as their compliance allows both them and others to achieve a collective 
outcome. When they are this powerful, norms shape equilibria, as in the case of FGC, where no 
actor can deviate from the norm, unless people collectively adopt a new norm. Change strategies 
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would require helping people discuss how harmful practices embody collective values (love for 
children) and goals (getting children married), and identify different social strategies that would 
still respect their existing values and help them achieve their collective goal, as suggested by 
Mackie and others in their FGC work (Haylock, Cornelius, Malunga, & Mbandazayo, 2016; 
Mackie & LeJeune, 2009) (see Table 4 for more details on the change strategies). 
When they have relatively strong influence, norms define the appropriate behavior. The 
relative independence of the behavior makes deviation possible but not advisable if one wants to 
achieve a specific individual outcome. Recall the example of a young student who might feel 
pressured to smoke marijuana or drink alcohol to be accepted in a group; his doing so or not, 
however, won’t threaten other people’s possibility to engage in the behavior (as would be the 
case with FGC). At this level of normative influence, there might still be normative equilibrium 
(nobody wants to be the first to stop smoking, worried others will ridicule him), but its strength 
is weaker than in the previous case, as achieving the independent outcome doesn’t require group 
coordination (as the young adolescent grows up, for instance, he might decide to stop smoking). 
Change strategies would require facilitating group dialogue on the nature of harm and on reasons 
for engaging in the practice, aiming at both helping individual resist old expectations and 
facilitating the emergence of new expectations in the group, as suggested by recent empirical 
studies of effective social norm change programs (Abramsky et al., 2014; Arango, Morton, 
Gennari, Kiplesund, & Ellsberg, 2014; Cislaghi, Gillespie, Fernald, & Weber, forthcoming; 
Ensminger & Kinght, 1997). 
[Table 3 here]  
When they have relatively weak influence, norms define what behavior is allowed or 
tolerated in a group. This is often the case with independent actions carried out in public: they 
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are detectable, but there are no or weak sanctions attached to them. Blood donation, for instance, 
is a detectable practice that might not result in great social rewards or punishment. Or consider a 
man “catcalling” a woman as he passes by in a car. Even though he might know that observers 
would disapprove, he may not care because he anticipates few sanctions. Changing strategies at 
this level of normative influence may include strengthening anticipation of sanctions by 
strengthening observers’ confidence in manifesting their collective disapproval, as suggested by 
Albaraccin and colleagues in their study of effective measures to increase condom use 
(Albarracín, Johnson, Fishbein, & Muellerleile, 2001; Albarracin, Kumkale, & Johnson, 2004).  
Finally, at the weakest level of influence, (the case of undetectable behaviors with no 
sanctions attached), norms might still offer people a model of behavior that becomes cognitively 
accessible to them. Social proof (the belief that if many do something, it must be good), and 
social imitation (the desire to do something just because others are), would both fall within this 
category. A famous example of this comes from Rubinstein’s (1983, 2002) seminal work on 
adolescent suicide in Micronesia. In the early 60s, suicide was almost unknown on the islands in 
the region, but at the end of the 80s, its rate was eight times higher than that of the United States. 
According to Rubinstein (and others who continued in his line of work), one of the reasons 
explaining the increase was copycatting by other adolescents who wanted to “try it out.” (For 
more examples see: Bollen & Phillips, 1982; Notredame et al., 2017). Of course, some of these 
adolescents had also other reasons to commit suicide (as, for instance, intergenerational conflicts: 
Ran, 2007), but the fact that others were doing it made it imaginable and somehow interesting.  
Change strategies for norms at this level of influence might include correcting 
misperceptions and providing individual normative feedback so that people learn that many 
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others engage in the positive health behavior of interest, a strategy used widely with university 
students in high-income countries and particularly the US (Berkowitz, 2014).  
[Table 4 here]  
 While we nod here to the strategies to change norms at each level of the spectrum, it is 
important to remember that effective behavior change strategies require addressing the full set of 
the factors that influence behavior, not just the normative element (reference anonymized). In the 
case of adopting a particular drug, for instance, a person’s decision will also be influenced by 
access to the health care system, provider input, and available resources, to cite just a few 
additional factors. 
 
Testing the theory of normative spectrum 
Ultimately, the value of our theory will depend on our ability to evaluate its validity 
through empirical testing.  The challenge will be to create metrics to represent the various 
different dimensions of the theory, from detectability to interdependence, to proximity.  One 
approach would be to apply a modified Delphi method to position behaviors along a continuum 
of the 5 factors under consideration.  The Delphi method is an anonymous method of arriving at 
consensus by soliciting input through multiple survey rounds, where participants are given 
feedback on the state of group opinion between each survey round (Hsu & Sandford, 2007).  A 
behavior or practice could be described in a particular context known to the respondents, and 
group members would be asked to rank the behavior according to its detectability, likelihood and 
nature of sanction, whether it is independent, dependent or interdependent, etc.  This process 
would yield a “strength score” suggesting a predicted strength between the norm and the 
behavior of interest.  Investigators could then run a survey to measure the prevalence of the norm 
FOUR AVENUES OF NORMATIVE INFLUENCE  23 
and the practice in the larger group, testing whether the correlation between the group’s 
normative belief and compliance with the norm is explained by the index of normative strength. 
In addition to testing the validity of our hypothesis, future investigations could examine if 
interdependence, detectability, sanctions, and normative distance have the same strength to 
influence behavior and how they may interact. Researchers might find, for instance, that 
interdependence trumps the presence of sanctions, such that a highly-interdependent behavior 
that is unlikely to encounter sanctions is still under strong normative influence. Doing this would 
require engaging with the exciting task of reviewing (and potentially developing) measures for 
the four characteristics we identified (e.g. Labovitz & Hagedorn, 1973; Rauhut & Winter, 2010; 
Singelis, 1994) and then use those measures systematically in a survey or comparable tool, a 
project that we plan to take forward in the future. 
Conclusion 
As practitioners design efforts to use social norm theory to facilitate behavior change, it 
is important to understand the different ways in which norms might operate. Our paper includes 
three key messages for scholars and practitioners. The first is that normative change can be an 
important component of behavior change, although the exact contribution of the former to the 
latter varies by the strength of the norm and other factors that affect behavior; having tools to 
understand the strength of the normative is important to design an effective intervention. Even 
though much of the theoretical work done on norms and health in LMIC is based on findings 
from FGC, not all practices are under the same normative strength. It would be dangerous to 
believe that normative change could achieve behavioral change in the same way across different 
practices.  
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Our second message is that it’s important to develop a theoretical hypothesis of how 
norm strength varies; we propose a simple, testable framework that describes the factors that 
affect normative strength. There is a risk in using intervention approaches that target practices 
under strong normative influence to address practices under low normative influence. If those 
latter interventions fail to achieve change in people’s behavior, donors and practitioners might 
conclude that the role of norms is irrelevant. We don’t think so. Our hypothesis is that norms can 
act to hinder or accelerate social change for practices both under stronger and weaker normative 
influence, but that practitioners must take into account how normative strength interacts with 
other individual, material, structural, and social factors (Reference anonymized). Effective 
interventions would thus be integrated, targeting the multiple factors that sustain a harmful 
practice.  
Finally, we suggest that it is misleading to assume (for the purposes of designing 
interventions) that norms operate similarly with all behaviors, especially given that behaviors 
vary according to degree of independence, detectability, sanctions, and how directly they relate 
to the norm.  We are confident that practitioners and researchers will find inspiration in this 
hypothesis as they continue to explore how social norms influence behavior, positioning them to 
eventually harness the full potential of social norm strategies for protecting and increasing 
people’s health. 
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